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ABSTRACT: Private enforcement of competition law serves many important goals, 
including deterrence of future anti-competitive harms and correction of past harms. 
This article sheds light on several potential legal obstacles to such enforcement which 
could prevent it from achieving its goals. The examples mainly build upon the experi-
ence of different jurisdictions with private litigation. It also suggests some possible 
solutions for dealing with or limiting such obstacles. As Europe is in the early stages 
of applying its Damages Directive and creating a private competition law enforcement 
regime, recognising – and possibly avoiding – obstacles to efficient private enforce-
ment is both timely and important. 
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1. Introduction: Private Enforcement – An Important Step Forward
Private enforcement of competition law serves many important goals. It 
increases deterrence.1 Effective deterrence requires that the expected pen-
alty, which is a function of both probability of detection and punishment 
* DOI: https://doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2019.1835.
** Professor and Director of the Centre for Law and Technology, University of Haifa Faculty of Law, 
and President, International Association of Competition Law Scholars (ASCOLA); Lawyer, LL.M.
1 For some empirical works on the subject focusing on the U.S., see Robert H. Lande and Joshua 
P. Davis,“Comparative deterrence from private enforcement and criminal enforcement of the U.S. 
antitrust laws”, Brigham Young University Law Review 2011, 2 (2011): 315; Robert H. Lande and 
Joshua P. Davis, “Restoring the legitimacy of private antitrust enforcement”, in A Report to the 
45th President of the United States (American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition 
Policy), 219.
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as well as the size of the penalties imposed, exceeds the expected gains 
of competition law infringements. By increasing both parameters, private 
enforcement reduces the profitability of engaging in anti-competitive con-
duct. In addition, private suits compensate those harmed by the infringe-
ments, thereby furthering corrective justice.2 Finally, by increasing incen-
tives of market players to identify violations, private enforcement may 
strengthen awareness and support for competition laws and their enforce-
ment, thereby contributing to the culture of competition.3 Accordingly, 
the importance of private litigation of competition law violations cannot 
be overstated.4
If structured efficiently, a positive interplay may be created between pri-
vate and public enforcement. Most commentators point to the fact that 
public enforcement may facilitate private enforcement because of follow-
on actions for damages, which can be based on the gathering of informa-
tion and proof of the violation by the public authority, making it easier for 
the private plaintiff to concentrate on proving specific damages.5 Moreover, 
public enforcement contributes to public awareness of competition law 
prohibitions, which can lead to more private cases. Private enforcement 
affects public enforcement as well. On the one hand, private enforcement 
might duplicate enforcement efforts and costs and affect the willingness of 
regulators to impose high penalties in public enforcement cases.6 It might 
also affect the development of legal doctrines to reflect private interests 
rather than public ones, given that courts might not always be aware of 
the wider implications of their findings. Also, private competition law 
enforcement might negatively impact leniency. Whereas infringers can 
potentially be granted immunity from public enforcement or reduction 
of fines if they cooperate with the authorities, leniency does not extend 
2 Wouter P. J. Wils, “The relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for 
damages”, World Competition 32 (2009): 3. 
3 Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Jakob Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages in Europe: 
A proposal for standing in line with efficient private enforcement”, World Competition 29, no. 3 
(2006): 396.
4 For recognition of its importance see, e.g., Judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd. v. 
Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraphs 26-27. The U.S. Supreme Court recently 
acknowledged it as well: Apple Inc. v. Pepper et al., 17-204, 587 U.S. (2019), 12, 14 (“Leaving con-
sumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers […] directly contradict[s] the longstanding goal of 
effective private enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases”).
5 Wils, “The relationship”, 19-20.
6 Wils, “The relationship”.
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to private suits.7 On the other hand, private enforcement can strengthen 
calls for public enforcement of competition laws, due to cost savings to 
plaintiffs created by follow-on actions. This, in turn, may directly or indi-
rectly reduce inefficient enforcement or political capture of competition 
authorities. Furthermore, by bringing more cases to trial, private cases 
may increase deterrence and thus save public resources and may also clar-
ify and develop competition law.8
Commentators point to several advantages private litigants may bring 
to the table. First, those harmed might have strong incentives to pursue 
an end to an anti-competitive conduct in order to stop it from harming 
them and to receive compensation for damages.9 Furthermore, by ena-
bling the harmed party to take the lead in the legal process, private suits 
might potentially add a psychological dimension to the pursuit of viola-
tions, possibly uncovering otherwise unknown infringements. While pub-
lic authorities may also have strong incentives to put an end to such anti-
competitive conduct, they may have limited funds or other priorities (such 
as pursuing only cases beyond a certain size of damages). Additionally, 
the harmed parties might be in a better position to analyse and detect an 
infringement.10 Market participants who possess industry-specific knowl-
edge and interact with suppliers or rivals that behave anti-competitively 
are often the first to notice an infringement. They may also have access to 
specific evidence.11 As Brodley suggests, they are “ideal litigants in terms 
of litigation capability because they are likely to have the skill, knowledge 
of the industry, and motivation to mount a powerful case with speed and 
precision”.12 
These benefits translate into higher deterrence, especially where pri-
vate suits are not simply follow-ons, which are based on prior government 
action and investigation. Yet, even when such cases do constitute follow-
on suits, they still increase deterrence by increasing sanctions. Indeed, one 
study showed that in the sixty largest private cartel cases in the U.S. in 
which an infringement was found, compensation in the amount of approx-
imately 33 billion U.S. dollars was imposed, whereas the fines imposed by 
7 Wils, “The relationship”, 27-32. 
8 See. e.g., Wils, “The relationship”.
9 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”, 395-420.
10 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
11 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
12 Joseph F. Brodley, “Antitrust standing in private merger cases: Reconciling private incentives 
and public enforcement goals”, Michigan Law Review 94, no. 1 (1995): 34. 
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the Department of Justice in those cases stood at approximately 11.7 bil-
lion.13 Accordingly, private litigation can create a credible threat of pen-
alties which might significantly affect the balance of expected costs and 
benefits of potential infringers. 
Given the many advantages brought about by private competition law 
enforcement, it is important to develop efficient mechanisms for their 
enforcement. This short essay briefly surveys some legal pitfalls to be 
avoided, which are based on the experience of jurisdictions in which pri-
vate actions were already employed. The essay is not intended to provide 
a complete list of challenges but rather attempts to shed light on several 
pitfalls that can completely change the dynamics of private enforcement in 
a way that harms social welfare. Given that private enforcement in the EU 
is still in its early stages, the time is ripe for such a discussion.
2. Contractual Limitations on the Right to Private Actions 
An important issue involves the legality of contractual limitations that 
market players place on the ability or incentives of consumers or suppliers 
to bring private actions. Such contractual limitations can take many forms. 
They can be direct, for example by mandating the parties to waive their 
rights to challenge certain conduct.14 They can be indirect, for example by 
imposing a mandatory contractual requirement that any claims be settled 
through a personal arbitration process, that actions only be brought in a 
pre-specified court or country, that class actions be not allowed, or that 
the contract be automatically terminated once a private action is brought. 
While some of these limitations may have pro-competitive justifications, 
they may significantly affect the incentives and the ability of those harmed 
by anti-competitive conduct to bring private actions. Furthermore, if they 
are included in boilerplate contracts of dominant firms, their contractual 
partners might not easily avoid them.15 
13 Joshua P. Davis and Robert H. Lande, “Toward an empirical and theoretical assessment of pri-
vate antitrust enforcement”, Seattle University Law Review 36, no. 3 (2013): 1296-1333; Waller 
Spencer Weber, “Towards a constructive public-private partnership to enforce competition law”, 
World Competition 29, no. 3 (2006): 367. 
14 See. e.g., the discussion of the anti-competitive effects of no-contest clauses in patent licensing 
agreements, which have many parallels to this case: Michal Gal and Alan D. Miller, “Patent chal-
lenge clauses: A new antitrust offense?”, Iowa Law Review 102, no. 4 (2016): 1477; Alan D. Miller 
and Michal Gal, “Licensee patent challenges”, Yale Journal on Regulation 32, no. 1 (2015): 121.
15 Albert H. Choi and Kathryn Spier, “Class actions and private antitrust litigation”, Virginia Law 
and Economics Research Paper 29, no. 1 (2019): 2.
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In some cases, contractual limitations can completely eliminate the pos-
sibility that private actions will be brought. This may be the case when 
consumers are contractually prohibited from bringing class actions and 
the damage to each consumer is not large. In such cases, no consumer will 
have an economic incentive to bring a suit, a situation which economists 
call rational apathy. The same can be achieved by any contractual require-
ment that imposes extra costs on contractual parties wishing to engage in 
private litigation, as long as these costs are sufficiently high to counteract 
the expected private benefits from litigating the case. 
This is not just a theoretical claim. Choi and Spier have found that actual 
decline in class actions in the U.S. in recent years can be partly explained 
by the acceptance of such contractual limitations by courts.16 As they 
observe, “in a series of landmark rulings (…) the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld private contracts that block class actions”.17 They point, in particu-
lar, to three relatively recent cases in which the Court upheld mandatory 
individual arbitration clauses that prevented plaintiffs from bringing class 
actions. Concepcion18 involved a mandatory individual arbitration clause 
included in a commercial contract for telephone services provided by 
AT&T Mobility, a strong market player. The Court gave much weight to 
the Federal Arbitration Act, declaring that “courts must place arbitration 
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them 
according to their terms”.19 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis20 enforced manda-
tory individual clauses in an employment contract, even though employ-
ees often have weaker bargaining power when signing such contracts. 
The third case, Italian Colors,21 involved a competition law claim. Justice 
Kagan, who wrote the dissenting opinion, presented the facts as follows: 
“The owner of a small restaurant (Italian Colors) thinks that American 
Express (Amex) has used its monopoly power to force merchants to accept 
a form contract violating the antitrust laws. The restaurateur wants to chal-
lenge the allegedly unlawful provision (imposing a tying arrangement), 
but the same contract’s arbitration clause prevents him from doing so. 
That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit 
16 Choi and Spier, “Class actions”.
17 Choi and Spier, “Class actions”. 
18 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
19 Ibid.
20 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
21 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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of the antitrust claim a fool’s errand. So if the arbitration clause is enforce-
able, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust liability – even if it has in 
fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to 
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse”.22 
The Minority thus argued that allowing such contractual clauses to exist 
amounts to a “betrayal (…) of antitrust laws,” given that it “confers immu-
nity from potential meritorious (…) claims”.23 Such immunity need not 
be an outright prohibition on bringing cases but may involve clauses that 
prevent the effective vindication of a competition law right. The majority 
rejected the claim based on the argument that “the fact that it can be more 
expensive to litigate individual arbitrations than they are worth does not 
negate the right to pursue a statutory remedy”.24
Deference to arbitration clauses was also recently exhibited by the U.S. 
Congress. In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an agency 
which is in charge of overseeing and regulating consumer financial con-
tracts, sought to protect class actions in consumer financial contracts that 
are often boilerplate contracts. To do so, it issued a rule that prohibited 
mandatory arbitration clauses in certain consumer financial contracts.25 
The U.S. Congress overturned the rule by a close vote.26
In our view, this is the wrong road to take. Contractual terms that prac-
tically prevent the ability of private plaintiffs to pursue a competition 
law claim should be prohibited. Such terms close an important door for 
incentivising strong market players not to engage in violations involving 
small individual damages but causing large aggregate harm, leaving those 
harmed to rely on public enforcement. They also completely shut the door 
on compensation for harm.
For similar reasons, courts should carefully consider before placing 
restrictions on the standing rights of plaintiffs. In several decisions the 
U.S. Supreme Court adopted positions that restrict the ability of some 
plaintiffs to bring class actions, basing class certification on the extent 
of the connection between the plaintiffs, the violation, and the damage 
the plaintiffs sustained. Such restraints might be justified. For example, 




25 Choi and Spier, “Class action”, 2-3, footnote 5.
26 Choi and Spier, “Class action”, 2-3, footnote 5, citing to U.S. H.J. Res. 111 (October 24, 2017).
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prevent the misuse of private rights of action.27 Yet, it is important to bal-
ance these concerns with the benefits private enforcement brings about to 
ensure they are not given too much weight and that less-restrictive meth-
ods for overcoming such limitations are not overlooked.28 
We argue that competition authorities have an important role to play 
in the process of shaping the rules to reach an optimal balance between 
the competing considerations in the cases explored above.29 As noted else-
where, competition authorities offer two main comparative advantages.30 
First, they possess significant expertise and experience in analysing the 
competitive impact of a wide range of market conducts.31 Second, they are 
often less susceptible to political pressures than legislators and regulators32 
due, in part, to the fact that competition law is not sector-specific and they 
are independent regulatory agencies. This is not to say that competition 
authorities are shielded from political pressures, but they are often less 
likely to yield to them.33 Their advisory role can take shape through sub-
missions to relevant courts and through consultations with decision-mak-
ers on legislative and regulatory procedures that may significantly impact 
competition law enforcement. If made public, these actions may also create 
a basis for public debate. Such debate will limit the incentives and ability of 
decision-makers to make decisions against the public interest.34
27 Choi and Spier, “Class action”, 4.
28 Waller, “Constructive public-private partnership”; R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon, and 
Sue H. Mialon, “Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis”, Journal of Public 
Economics 92, no. 10-11 (2008): 1863; Choi and Spier, “Class actions”, showing that no private 
enforcement at all can be bad for society, yet its overuse could be bad not only for companies but 
mainly for consumers themselves.
29 For the advisory role of competition authorities see, e.g., OECD, Relationship between Regulators 
and Competition Authorities (1999). For an overview of the literature on how the characteristics 
of regulators affect their ability to serve the public interest see, e.g., Anna Butenko, and Pierre 
Larouche, “Regulation for innovativeness or regulation of innovation?”, Law, Innovation and 
Technology 7, no. 1 (2015): 52. 
30 Michal Gal, “3D challenges: Ensuring competition and innovation in 3D printing”, forthcom-
ing, Vanderbilt Journal of Law and Technology (2020).
31 OECD, id., at 8-9.
32 Harold Demsetz, The Economics of The Business Firms: Seven Critical Commentaries (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
33 Michal Gal and Inbal Faibish-Wassmer, “Six principles for limiting government-facilitated 
restraints on competition”, Common Market Law Review 44, no. 1 (2007): 69.
34 International Competition Network, Advocacy and Competition Policy – Report prepared by the 
Advocacy Working Group, i-iii, 2002.
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3. Excessive Pricing Litigation: The Next Tsunami? 
Private competition law actions encompass all competition law offenses 
that might create damages. Nonetheless, some offenses raise higher chal-
lenges to private enforcement. Nowhere are such challenges more pro-
nounced than in private litigation of excessive pricing claims. As Gal elab-
orates elsewhere, private litigation of such cases might actually harm social 
welfare, rather than increase it, and might even clash with some notions of 
fairness.35 Here we present the bare bones of the argument.
Excessive pricing has long been prohibited under the “unfair trade con-
ditions” prohibition in Article 102 of the TFEU.36 Indeed, its doctrinal 
roots run deep.37 Yet, for several combined reasons, it raises great difficul-
ties for private enforcement. 
The prohibition suffers from serious and inherent difficulties in its 
implementation.38 In particular, it lacks clear and workable criteria. The 
pragmatic difficulties of determining when a price becomes unfair were 
recognised by the Commission and by AG Wahl, who recently empha-
sised the “absence of a ubiquitous test and (…) the limitations inherent 
in all existing methods”39 of determining when a price is excessive. He 
also recognised that “[b]ecause of those limitations, antitrust authorities 
and economists generally agree that the exercise consisting of determin-
ing the benchmark price in a case of possible excessive pricing carries a 
high risk of producing [errors]”.40 These uncertainties come at a high cost, 
35 Michal Gal, “The case for limiting private litigation of excessive pricing cases”, forthcoming, 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2020). 
36 This possibility was first acknowledged in Judgment of 29 February 1968, Parke, Davis and CO. 
v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and Centrafarm, 24/67 EU:C:1968:11. The ECJ indicated 
that wide variation in prices not justified on objective grounds would be a factor in determin-
ing whether conduct was abusive. This possibility was more clearly established in Judgment of 
18 February 1971, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l. and others, 40/70, EU:C:1971:18, and most recently in 
Judgement of 14 September 2017, Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra / Latvijas 
Autoru apvienība v. Konkurences padome, C-177/16 EU:C:2017:689, supra note 6, paragraph 35.
37 Michal Gal, “Abuse of dominance – exploitative abuses”, in Handbook on European Competition 
Law, ed. Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar, 2013), 385.
38 OECD, Roundtable on Excessive Pricing, DAF/COMP 2011 (2011).
39 Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 6 April 2017, Biedrība “Autortiesību un komunicēšanās 
konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība” v. Konkurences padome, C-177/16, 
EU:C:2017:286. 
40 Opinion of AG Wahl delivered on 6 April 2017, Biedrība “Autortiesību un komunicēšanās 
konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība” v. Konkurences padome, C-177/16, 
EU:C:2017:286, paragraph 42.
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as they might chill dynamic and productive efficiency by reducing invest-
ment incentives of those contemplating whether to invest in creating new 
or better products or production processes in order to enter or expand in 
the market. They have led the Commission to be cautious in applying the 
offense. An overview of the Commission’s practice reveals that allegations 
of excessive pricing are rare.41 This state of affairs has existed ever since the 
excessive pricing offense was recognised. 
Private litigation creates additional challenges to applying the prohibi-
tion. It prevents the use of public discretion in sorting out ex ante those 
cases that harm consumer welfare from those that do not. So far, competi-
tion authorities have dealt with the inherent limitations of the prohibition 
by adopting a cautionary and largely non-interventionist approach.42 The 
option of applying public discretion in bringing excessive pricing cases, to 
ensure that they further welfare, is no longer available, as courts must hear 
all cases that come before them. Second, private suits differ significantly in 
what the decision-maker is required to decide, as regards the cases heard 
so far. Indeed, the task faced by general courts is more difficult. Up until 
now, competition authorities and the reviewing courts only had to deter-
mine whether a specific price set by the dominant firm was fair. In a pri-
vate excessive pricing suit, this is no longer sufficient. Rather, to determine 
the size of damages, the court would need to identify the precise point at 
which the price becomes unfair. Broad-brush estimations with wide mar-
gins to avoid error are no longer possible. Yet, there is no clear methodol-
ogy for determining when exactly a price becomes unfair. In the famous 
General Motors (GM) case, for instance, GM charged a fee that was 2,400 
percent higher than the fee charged for such certificates for cars sold by 
GM itself. This difference is clearly excessive, and thus the decision was 
an easy one to make. But at what point exactly does the price start to be 
excessive? This is a question that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) did 
not need to answer, but general courts will. The combination of the above 
factors, together with the inherent difficulty of determining when a price 
41 Erik Pijnacker Hordijk, “Excessive pricing under EC competition law: An update in light of 
Dutch developments”, in International Antitrust Law and Policy, ed. Barry Hawk (New York: Juris 
Publishing, 2001), 463.
42 See, for example, European Commission (1975), Fifth Report on Competition Policy, point 3 
(“measures to halt the abuse of dominant positions cannot be converted into systematic monitor-
ing of prices”); European Commission (1994), XXIVth Report of on Competition Policy, point 207; 
and European Commission (1997), XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, point 77; OECD, op. cit. 
supra note 17, contribution of the EU, pp. 317, 321. 
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becomes unfair, may increase overdeterrence, unless the conditions for the 
prohibition are set at a socially efficient level.
General courts may face further difficulties in regulating prices to ensure 
that dynamic efficiency is not impaired to the extent that overall welfare is 
harmed.43 Designing and applying a welfare-enhancing rule against exces-
sive prices requires the decision-maker to engage in complex economic 
analysis and to have a sound understanding of how markets work. The 
courts’ general lack of economic training, coupled with the vagueness of 
the prohibition and the need to precisely pinpoint the fair price, may lead 
to several “traps” that increase the risk that courts will reach socially harm-
ful decisions. Most importantly, general courts might fall into a “fairness 
trap”. The fact that linguistically the prohibition is based on fairness could 
lead some courts to disregard dynamic efficiency concerns – or, for that 
matter, any economic concern – and simply apply the prohibition based 
on moral notions of fairness. The fact that the ECJ has never explicitly 
endorsed the dynamic efficiency consideration strengthens this concern.44 
General courts might also fall into a “cost trap”: assuming that the com-
petitive price – which is much more easily calculated – or any price near it 
is the fair price. Applying such a rule makes the decision-maker’s job much 
easier and at first glance also appears to serve consumer welfare: are low, 
competitive prices not the very essence of competition? Furthermore, such 
a rule may sit well with a populist but ill-founded sentiment that firms 
should not be allowed to charge supra-competitive prices. Yet, it clearly 
harms dynamic efficiency. Other institutional limitations abound.
The factors discussed above may lead to a tsunami of excessive pricing 
cases, which may detract from public welfare. Indeed, in Israel, which has 
copied Article 102 of the TFEU into its laws45 and has recognised a pri-
vate right of action and the right to bring class actions, private excessive 
pricing suits have become the main competition law prohibition to be liti-
gated. While the Israeli Competition Authority has never been able to find 
even one excessive pricing case that would further social welfare, there has 
been a surge of private suits.46 In the past three years alone, almost thirty 
43 Gal, “Limiting private litigation”.
44 The ECJ’s requirement that the cost-price ratio be significant and persistent may be an indirect 
indicator of such a consideration. 
45 Section 29A of the Israeli Competition Law 1988.
46 For a survey of some of these cases, see Yossi Spiegel, “Antitrust enforcement of the prohibition 
of excessive pricing – the Israeli experience”, in Excessive Prices and Competition Law Enforcement, 
ed. Frédéric Jenny and Yannis Katsoulacos (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 127.
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such cases were brought, pertaining to a wide range of products and ser-
vices, including margarine, cottage cheese, Gillette razors, popcorn sold 
in cinemas, hard cheese, cocoa powder, instant coffee, cornflakes, sour 
cream, green tea, and Coca-Cola. As can be seen, these are very specific – 
and not necessarily highly important – markets. None are protected from 
competition by high legal or regulatory barriers, none are natural or statu-
tory monopolies, and all compete with other products. Furthermore, the 
price margins in some of these markets are not notably high, and in most 
markets the supracompetitive price arises from the comparative advan-
tages of a more desirable product. As a result, Israeli courts have become 
a special kind of price regulator – one that does not have the discretion to 
choose the products to be regulated, lacks economic expertise, and must 
determine fair prices ex post. A similar danger may arise in the EU, espe-
cially in those Member States that will endorse class action.47 
To overcome at least some of these concerns, it is important to place 
significant limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to bring private exces-
sive pricing suits, in line with the current practice of the Commission 
and the numerous proposals by commentators. A combined effort by 
the Commission, national competition authorities, and European courts 
could build on and complement their comparative competences. First, the 
Commission and national competition authorities, potentially together 
with legislators, could create more detailed guidelines that reduce at least 
some of the vagueness in the excessive pricing prohibition. Such guide-
lines should emphasise, inter alia, the need to apply and differentiate both 
prongs of the legal test (i.e., the excessiveness and unfairness of the price 
charged by the dominant firm); the need to apply the rule with an eye 
toward a balanced view of consumer welfare (focusing not only on static 
efficiency but also on dynamic efficiency); and the fact that the competi-
tive or near-competitive price must not be used as the benchmark for a 
fair price. The guidelines should also include a general requirement for 
courts to ensure that hearing the case indeed serves the public interest. 
Such guidelines – especially when mandatory – are especially important to 
counter populist and ill-founded public perceptions on what should con-
stitute a fair price and the role of courts in regulating such prices.48 
47 Gal, “Limiting private litigation”.
48 Gal, “Limiting private litigation”.
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4. Fragmentation of Cases
Fragmentation of cases may be suboptimal for defendants, plaintiffs, and 
courts. Let us assume that a cartel negatively affects consumers all over the 
EU, and numerous parallel private damages actions are brought in differ-
ent Member States, or even in different courts within the same State. Let 
us also assume that the outcome in each court hearing the case would have 
been similar, that is, the court would have found that the cartel existed 
and consumers had been harmed and would have calculated the harm in 
a similar fashion. This leads to duplication of financial costs as well as of 
time and effort. Put differently, under the current system, many resources 
will be wasted on cases where plaintiffs and defendants are jockeying in 
literally dozens of cases involving the same basic claims against the same 
set of defendants.49 Furthermore, fragmentation might limit incentives of 
the plaintiffs to bring the case in the first place. This is especially relevant 
where class actions are allowed: the lower the overall compensation (due, 
inter alia, to the size of the class), the lower the expected compensation, 
and the lower the economic motivation to bringing the case or to invest 
in proving all of its effects, potentially only dealing with the low-hanging 
fruits.
Fragmentation of cases might also prevent otherwise good settlements 
for consumers due to externalities among parallel cases. In accordance 
with game theory, even if the defendant had otherwise agreed to settle 
for a certain amount in the first case, he might not have done so if he had 
assumed that the first settlement will serve as a signal for other courts or 
as a baseline for the next settlement.50 So instead of entering into it, the 
defendant could choose to fight harder than otherwise optimal for him 
and for the plaintiffs in the first court. The same phenomenon is observed 
in other areas with similar institutional arrangements, such as securities 
litigation. Accordingly, parallel cases might prevent compensation and 
limit deterrence. Finally, fragmentation limits the ability of the decision-
maker to look at the bigger picture, which might be necessary in order to 
offer a better allocation of damages among all harmed, to ensure that all 
are compensated fairly and that defendants bear less of a risk of duplicative 
compensation.51 
49 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
50 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
51 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
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In light of the above, courts should be more lenient with requests to con-
solidate cases. They should also not disregard similar private actions in 
other courts or sequencing issues, should the relevant information be pre-
sented to them. Article 15 of the Damages Directive relates to “actions for 
damages by claimants from different levels in the supply chain”, which can 
“lead to a multiple liability or to an absence of liability of the infringer”. In 
such cases, national courts may “take due account of (a) actions for dam-
ages that are related to the same infringement of competition law, but that 
are brought by claimants from other levels in the supply chain; (b) judg-
ments resulting from actions for damages as referred to in point (a)”. A 
similar logic can and should be carried over to parallel claims in national 
courts, even at a similar level of the supply chain or in different Member 
States.
Institutional solutions might also be contemplated. Schinkel and 
Rüggeberg suggest that the assessment of damages in a specific case be 
entrusted in the hands of a “central authority”. This public unit will act 
as an amicus curiae and will have the resources and ability to perform an 
investigation of the total economic damage caused by the infringement as 
well as the portion of the damage in the specific case. The court will not be 
obligated to adopt the assessment, but it could reduce some of the obstacles 
to proving competition law offenses and reduce duplication of costs. The 
proposal is designed to ensure that private action provides efficient and 
proper compensation and is not disproportional from any perspective.52 
Finally, in line with a proposal made by Gal elsewhere,53 in light of the 
problem of sub-optimal deterrence of cartels arising from the existing 
atomistic system of competition enforcement, it might be worth consider-
ing the adoption of legal tools which enable courts to adopt and rely upon 
findings of hard-core cartels in other courts, provided that such cartel 
decisions meet criteria that ensure that such reliance is reasonable and fair. 
This “free movement of judgments” holds potential to overcome the main 
obstacles to efficient deterrence and to significantly increase both domestic 
as well as global welfare. Its costs can also be largely overcome by design-
ing appropriate solutions. The political implications are also not prohibi-
tive. Indeed, jurisdictions already rely on judgments of other courts that 
52 Schinkel and Rüggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages”.
53 Michal Gal, “Free movement of judgments: Increasing deterrence of international cartels 
through jurisdictional reliance”, Virginia Journal of International Law 51, no. 1 (2010): 57. 
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do not significantly differ from the decisions at hand.54 Although the pro-
posal was made with regard to international collateral estoppel, its logic 
can be applied even more easily to cases that only involve courts in EU 
Member States. 
5. Calculating the Height of Damages
One of the major difficulties involved in private competition law litigation 
involves the calculation of damages caused by the infringement. While 
competition authorities impose fines based on firms’ turnover – which 
does not require them to engage in an analysis of the exact harms created 
by the competition law offense – courts cannot take a similar path. They 
must engage in fact-based economic analysis of the effects of the conduct 
on plaintiffs. 
Calculating such damages might raise significant difficulties. Below we 
note some of them. The calculation requires courts to engage in a “what 
if” exercise: compare the situation that the anti-competitive conduct has 
created to a situation that would have existed absent such conduct. In some 
cases the court might be able to use benchmark prices and market condi-
tions from an earlier period or from other, relatively similar, markets. Yet, 
when this is not possible, the court must engage in a theoretical compari-
son, which raises calculation challenges. They include, inter alia, the fol-
lowing examples. 
First, courts must give weight to the effects of external changes in market 
conditions, which are not related to the anti-competitive conduct, on mar-
ket conditions and conduct. Such changes might include, for example, the 
exit of a competitor for reasons unrelated to the infringement or a change 
in the prices of some inputs that affect all suppliers. 
Second, courts may face difficulties in determining the extent of a new 
entry that was blocked by the anti-competitive conduct. The Israeli Elite/
Cadbury case illustrates this point.55 Cadbury, a producer of chocolates, 
tried to enter the Israeli market. Elite, which holds a monopoly position in 
the market for chocolate, engaged in clearly abusive conduct which erected 
artificial entry barriers: it set predatory prices and entered into agreements 
with some supermarkets that prohibited them from placing Cadbury 
chocolates near the register or from selling them at all. There was no doubt 
54 Gal, “Free movement”.
55 AT 612/06 Gen. Dir. v. Straus Elite Ltd. ATTRIB, 37(4) Dinim Mehozi 298, 2007 Antitrust 
5000477.
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that this conduct fell squarely within the abuse of dominance prohibitions. 
Cadbury then sued for damages. It argued that its damages amounted to 
eighty million Israeli shekels; Elite argued for six. Since Cadbury chocolate 
was never sold in Israel, Elite claimed that it was not proven that consum-
ers would have liked the taste, and it was uncertain whether Cadbury com-
plied with some regulatory requirements. Such cases raise even more fun-
damental challenges: even if Cadbury had entered, a status quo might have 
been created in which Cadbury would have enjoyed the price umbrella56 
formed by the monopolist and would have set its prices at monopolistic or 
near monopolistic levels. Theoretically, the loss of such monopolistic prof-
its could serve as a basis for calculating the damages the potential entrant 
suffered, even if consumers were not harmed. The question arises whether 
the potential entrant should be compensated for its loss of ability to charge 
monopolistic prices. The final example of a calculation challenge relates 
to the ability to use the price in the market, once a cartel has ceased to 
operate, as a benchmark for the “what if” test. The reason is that market 
conditions may be “sticky” in the sense that market parties might be used 
to high prices and no longer need direct contact, but rather engage in oli-
gopolistic coordination which achieves similar results to the cartel.
These expected difficulties in the calculation of damages can be reduced 
by several institutional and legal methods which should be developed or 
applied by courts. For example, courts must ensure that they have good 
economic consultants. Such consultants can be brought by the parties, 
nominated by the court, or even form part of the court hearing the case. 
In addition, it is advisable that decision-makers learn from the experience 
of other decision-makers who have confronted such issues in the past. 
U.S. courts, in particular, have gained much experience over the years 
in calculating competition law damages. It might be worthwhile for the 
Commission or for national competition authorities, once private actions 
become more commonplace, to take steps to ensure that EU courts need 
not start experimenting anew where established and efficient calculation 
methods exist elsewhere. This can be achieved through guidance papers, 
amici curiae, or seminars. While in some cases the parties to the case 
might have incentives to bring such information before the court, in others 
56 Such an effect arises when a cartel or monopoly affecting part of a relevant market causes prices 
in the rest of the market to rise. See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 2nd Edition (The Hague: Wolters Kluwer Law 
& Business, 2000): 347.
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they might be incentivised to strategically expose only those rules which 
serve their purposes or might not be aware of such rules, or the size of the 
damages might not justify an investment in studying foreign experience.
6. Applying Divergent Procedural Rules?
A final issue raised by private competition law enforcement is whether 
national courts hearing competition law cases should necessarily adopt 
similar procedural rules – such as burdens of proof and presumptions – to 
those adopted by the Commission, national competition law authorities, or 
European courts reviewing the decisions of the former. The question arises 
due to the diverse institutional features of the different decision-makers 
involved in competition law enforcement. Of particular importance is the 
divergence in the level of economic expertise and market analysis abili-
ties of national courts compared to competition agencies, as well as the 
resources each has for engaging in an in-depth economic analysis.
The argument for procedural rules that reflect the different institutional 
capabilities of divergent decision-makers is based on decision theory.57 
Decision theory is an analytical tool for shaping legal rules that takes into 
account conceptual considerations as well as the institutional features and 
practical abilities of decision-makers. It balances the legal process costs of 
obtaining and analysing all the relevant information, with the error costs 
resulting from impartial information or its erroneous analysis. The former 
include costs of gathering factual data and the costs of analysing it (includ-
ing the employment of external experts, where necessary). The latter 
include false positives, which arise when the rule is applied too widely and 
captures conduct that does not harm social welfare, and false negatives, 
when the rule is applied too narrowly and does not capture those types of 
conduct that harm social welfare. The probability of error is affected, inter 
alia, by decision-makers’ characteristics, especially their ability to analyse 
and understand the information before them. Accordingly, an optimal 
legal rule is not necessarily one that would lead to a hypothetically efficient 
57 See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, “An economic analysis of legal rulemaking”, 
Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (1974): 257. For the application of the decision theory in com-
petition law see, e.g., Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber, “Competition policy with opti-
mally differentiated rules instead of ‘per se rules vs rule of reason’”, Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 2, no. 2 (2006): 215; C. Frederick Ⅲ Beckner and Steven C. Salop, “Decision theory and 
antitrust rules”, Antitrust Law Journal 67, no. 1 (1999): 41; Mark S. Popofsky, “Defining exclusion-
ary conduct: Section 2, the rule of reason, and the unifying principle underlying antitrust rules”, 
Antitrust Law Journal 73, no. 2 (2006): 435.
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outcome, but one that maximizes social welfare under realistic assump-
tions of enforcement, to ensure that its benefits outweigh its costs of appli-
cation in practice.
In line with decision theory, the divergent institutional capabilities of 
national courts and competition agencies might justify different optimal 
procedural rules for the same anti-competitive conduct and the same legal 
provision. For example, where the decision-maker enjoys strong analytical 
capabilities, and therefore his error costs of analysing complex economic 
situations are low, a rule of reason might be justified, and vice versa. This, 
in turn, might justify the creation of stronger – even if less economically 
accurate – presumptions in cases heard by national courts, might affect the 
allocation of burdens of proof, and might justify placing stronger limita-
tions on certain cases heard by national courts, such as excessive pricing 
cases.
At the same time, when deciding whether to apply similar rules, broader 
considerations should not be disregarded. Of particular importance is the 
ability of the European Court of First Instance and the European Court 
of Justice, as well as of the Commission, to provide guidance to national 
courts in applying competition law prohibitions. This is especially impor-
tant at the current formative stage, where most national courts are just 
beginning to hear competition law cases. Applying similar rules also 
increases certainty and predictability for all parties involved. Such benefits 
are on-going: the continued application of similar rules by all decision-
makers generates positive network externalities: as more decisions that 
apply the law to various factual settings accumulate, legal certainty is typi-
cally further increased. It also saves the costs that national courts would 
have incurred in the course of determining what rules to apply and limit 
potential divergence across Member States.58 
Accordingly, it is suggested that in general the procedural rules applied 
by national courts follow those of the European Courts, the Commission, 
and national competition agencies. Nonetheless, where institutional dif-
ferences significantly affect error costs, divergent procedural rules should 
be contemplated. The Commission, national competition agencies, and EU 
Courts can assist in the shaping of such procedural rules to ensure harmo-
nization across national courts.
58 See, e.g., Michal Gal, “The ‘cut and paste’ of article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a 
successful transplant”, European Journal of Law Reform 9, no. 3 (2007): 467.
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7. Conclusion
Private enforcement is on the road to soon become an important new 
pathway for competition law enforcement. While it brings about signifi-
cant benefits, it also raises concerns that its application in practice might 
not always be optimal and might even harm social welfare. The EU and 
Member States are currently in the formative period which will set the 
stage for private actions for years to come. It is thus important to invest 
in recognising and trying to avoid potential pitfalls, some of which plague 
existing private competition law enforcement elsewhere. Accordingly, this 
short article has attempted to shed light on several challenges that must be 
addressed in order to enable private competition law enforcement to bring 
about its potential benefits, suggesting some solutions that can be adopted 
to address such challenges. This article makes clear that the adoption of 
the Damages Directive is only the first step in the important process of 
shaping their application in order to increase social welfare. 
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